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IN SEARCH OF SKIDMORE
Peter L. Strauss*
―How terribly strange to be seventy‖1

Ever since 1827, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that
when a court is interpreting a statute that falls within the authority of an
administrative agency, the court in reaching its own judgment about the
statute‘s meaning should give substantial weight to the agency‘s view.2
Repeated again and again over the years in varying formulations, this
proposition found its apotheosis in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,3 a unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Jackson in 1944. His opinion took the
proposition to be so obvious that no citation was required. Justice
Jackson‘s typically incisive and memorable formulation stuck. It found its
way into administrative law casebooks—also without reference to its many
predecessors. It has since been universally known as Skidmore deference,
treated as if it were simply his remarkable invention.
Four years earlier, the proposition had found expression in United States
v. American Trucking Ass’ns,4 a case often considered the dawn of postNew Deal reliance on legislative history. The Court made clear that the
question before it was one for it to decide, reiterating the oft-cited
proposition of Marbury v. Madison: ―The interpretation of the meaning of
statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial
function.‖5 But how was it to perform this ―exclusively judicial function‖?
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. My profound thanks go to Peter Shane and
Christopher Walker, who have capped their efforts in organizing this symposium with a
remarkable initial essay providing its readers with an overview of the whole. See Peter M.
Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (2014). I hope I may be forgiven, as one of the elders at
the symposium, for having so concentrated on two cases from 1944 whose relationship
seems to me to capture exactly the considerations of judicial role underlying Chevron, the
1984 opinion whose notoriety and thirtieth birthday provided the occasion for this
intellectual feast. That my views on Chevron may differ from some of those who joined me
at table should surprise no one who has followed the torrent of opinions and scholarship that
have sprung from that decision.
1. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, Old Friends, on BOOKENDS (Columbia Records 1968).
2. Edwards‘ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. 206, 210 (1827). For this history, see generally
Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012).
3. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
4. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
5. Id. at 544.
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Five pages further on in its opinion, explaining the weight it was giving to
agency views in doing so, the Court remarked:
The [two responsible agencies] . . . as we have said, have both interpreted
Section 204(a) as relating solely to safety of operation. In any case such
interpretations are entitled to great weight. This is peculiarly true here
where the interpretations involve ―contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery
in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they
are yet untried and new.‖ Furthermore, the Commission‘s interpretation
gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission
which suggested the provisions‘ enactment to Congress.6

This passage states three reasons for this recognition of the weight a
court should give an agency view: the agency‘s arguably better view as
sometime drafter; its obligations as the body responsible for putting the
scheme in motion; and, implicit ―in any case,‖ the fact of its continuous and
comprehensive view of (and responsibilities for) a statutory scheme that
would reach the courts only occasionally and in what would likely be quite
unrepresentative contexts.
In the same year as Skidmore, 1944, the Court took the further step of
placing a question that one might readily characterize as an issue of
statutory interpretation outside the ―exclusively judicial function.‖ In
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,7 it found, additionally, that the statute it
was interpreting had conferred on an administrative agency the primary
responsibility for determining, from a policy perspective, the meaning of a
statutory term that lacked fixed content.8 The National Labor Relations
Act9 applied to ―employees.‖10 While surely there were individuals who
must be regarded as employees (paid hourly wages, lacking managerial
responsibilities) and others who could not be so regarded (corporate
executives, occasional individual contractors), there was a middle ground
open to argument. The Court found, first, that Congress could not have
intended ―employee‖ to be governed in the administration of a national
statute by the use of varying state law.11 It found, second, that ―employee‖
had no uniform meaning in federal statutes. What remained, the Court
concluded, was that giving precise meaning to ―employee‖ under this
statute, within the middle ground whose existence it had determined, must
be a function of national labor policy.12 But Congress had made the
formulation of national labor policy the responsibility of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). While courts remained responsible to oversee the
legality and reasonableness of the Board‘s judgments, this valid delegation
of authority to the Board carried with it the corollary that courts could not
6. Id. at 549 (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933)).
7. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
8. Id. at 124–25.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
10. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124–25.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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properly substitute their own judgment about the precise application of the
statutory term to particular circumstances for that of the Board. Within the
middle ground, assigning meaning to ―employee‖ was thus a responsibility
of the Board, not the courts.
Hearst, too, joined the administrative law pantheon, although law school
teaching materials long questioned whether it could be reconciled with
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,13 a decision that seemed oblivious to the
NLRB‘s judgment about meaning. In Packard, the statute defined an
―employer‖ as ―any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly.‖14 The question for the Court was whether any employee who in
some respects served as a foreman could ever be considered a statutory
―employee‖ under the labor laws, or rather must always be considered an
―employer.‖15 The NLRB‘s judgment had wavered over time—coming
down on the side of ―employee‖ status for the 1100 foremen involved in
Packard, but seemingly adopting another view in other cases. Whether the
NLRB had reached an impermissible interpretation of the Labor Act was,
the Court declared, a ―naked question of law,‖ on which the agency‘s view
counted for naught.16
Reconciliation is possible if one understands the question as one of
boundary definition—could workers who were ―foremen‖ ever be statutory
employees? Put this way, it is a question to which Skidmore might have
been relevant, but not Hearst. While the Justices agreed with the Board that
Packard‘s foremen might possibly be characterized as ―employees,‖17 they
were deciding not who was an employee, but where the boundary for the
Board‘s permissible determination of that question lay. The extent of the
Board‘s authority presented an irreducibly judicial question, in American
Trucking‘s terms was ―exclusively a judicial function.‖ The thing to note is
that the Board‘s vacillation on the issue provided a standard reason, under
the cases captured in Skidmore, for the Court to disregard its views.
Seventy years ago, then, Skidmore and Hearst combined to frame two
propositions: first, that when courts are interpreting statutes, they may
sometimes have reason to give weight to agency views; and second, that to
the extent Congress empowers an agency to act using language of uncertain
meaning, it may also empower the agency reasonably to determine that
meaning within the resulting ambit of uncertainty, subject not to judicial
redetermination but to judicial oversight of its judgment for reasonableness.
Four decades later, Justice Stevens authored Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,18 the opinion whose thirtieth
birthday is the occasion for this symposium. Written for a unanimous
(although short-handed) Court whose Justices seemed to have had no

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

330 U.S. 485 (1947).
Id. at 488 (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152).
See id. at 486.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 497–98.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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thought that they were doing anything momentous,19 it can be understood to
have universalized Hearst. Chevron, that is, created a presumption that to
the extent any statute conferring authority for its administration on a
particular agency lacked a fixed meaning, the room its terms left open had
the effect that the Hearst Court had found to be explicit in the NLRA‘s use
of the term ―employee.‖ The uncertainties were to be regarded as
delegations to those agencies of a responsibility reasonably to choose
among the possibilities the statutory language offered. If the Justices found
nothing momentous or controversial in this, of course they were wrong.
Chevron has become the most cited of all opinions in the administrative law
canon, and it seems as well to have generated the largest body of scholarly
literature.
One quails at the thought of adding further to so many views of the
elephant, but a surprise in the decision last Term in City of Arlington v.
FCC20 incites it. The surprise? In Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion and
Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent for himself and Justices Kennedy and Alito,
184 years of what we have recently been calling Skidmore deference simply
disappeared. Save once in Justice Breyer‘s lonely concurrence in the
result,21 there is not a mention of the concept—indeed, its relevance is
effectively denied—in opinions signed by eight of the Justices.
SOME FURTHER BACKGROUND TO THE DISCUSSION OF CITY OF ARLINGTON
An intermediate development that underscores the surprise should be
mentioned. Hearst (that is to say, Chevron‘s direct ancestor) and Skidmore
appear side by side in United States v. Mead Corp.,22 a case in which an
agency (the Customs Bureau) had given uncertain statutory language a
particular meaning, but without acting in the manner in which Congress had
intended for its acts to be juris-generative—that is, authoritative for any
case but the one before it. Justice Souter, writing for eight, thus treated the
interpretive task as wholly the courts‘—Chevron did not apply.23
Nonetheless, in reaching its own judgment, in its own interpretation, he
wrote, citing Skidmore, a court should observe the practice of centuries and
accord appropriate weight to agency views.24 Justice Scalia wrote a lonely
and furious dissent—Chevron, he argued, had consigned Skidmore to the
waste-bin of history.25 There was no room for a second proposition about
deference; it had to be all (that is, Chevron, which he would have applied)
or nothing. The Skidmore formulation, he argued, was just too weak, an
invitation to judicial manipulation.26 Justice Souter‘s response to his
fulminations is, for me, a classic:
19. Thomas Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2005).
20. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
21. See id. at 1876 (Breyer, J. concurring).
22. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
23. Id. at 221.
24. See id. at 227–30.
25. See id. at 239–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 241.
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Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at
least some of this multifarious administrative action, we have to decide
how to take account of the great range of its variety. If the primary
objective is to simplify the judicial process of giving or withholding
deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing discretionary
administrative action must be declared irrelevant or minimized. If, on the
other hand, it is simply implausible that Congress intended such a broad
range of statutory authority to produce only two varieties of
administrative action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at all,
then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action must be taken
into account. Justice Scalia‘s first priority over the years has been to limit
and simplify. The Court‘s choice has been to tailor deference to variety.
This acceptance of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to
recognize more than one variety of judicial deference, just as the Court
has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would expect
Chevron deference.27

―Deference‖ is only one proposition concerning judicial review where
one might observe a contrast between simplifications to a single standard,
and tailoring to variety. This was hardly the first occasion on which Justice
Scalia‘s preferences for categorical simplicity led him into what for many
scholars of administrative law—as he once had been—were remarkable
surprises.
As a court of appeals judge, Judge Scalia had similarly attempted to
reduce to singular terms standards of review that were binary by statute, and
even more complex in practice. Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System28
required review both of an on-the-record adjudication, under the
Administrative Procedure Act‘s (APA) ―substantial evidence‖ test,29 and of
a rulemaking, subject to arbitrary and capriciousness review. 30 Ignoring
both the standard textualist trope that different verbal formulations in a
statute require different attributions of meaning, and the commonplace
difference between appellate review of a district court judge‘s findings of
fact (―clearly erroneous‖?) and a jury‘s (―no reasonable juror could find‖?),
Judge Scalia asserted that it would be impossible to imagine or administer
more than one standard of review of administrative findings of fact.31 In its
practical administration, even arbitrary and capriciousness review itself is
highly variable.32
Just as we treat ―preponderance,‖ ―clear and
27. Id. at 236–37 (majority opinion). Justice Souter adds:
It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not marked by a hardedged rule. But Chevron itself is a good example showing when Chevron
deference is warranted, while this is a good case showing when it is not. Judges in
other, perhaps harder, cases will make reasoned choices between the two
examples, the way courts have always done.
Id. at 237 & n.18.
28. 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
30. Id. § 706(2)(A).
31. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., 745 F.2d at 680–86.
32. Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (hard-look review of important rules), with Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (soft-
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convincing,‖ and ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ as identifying different, if
not logarithmically reducible zones of confidence in affirmative factfinding, ―no reasonable juror could find,‖ ―arbitrary and capricious,‖
―unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole,‖ and
―clearly erroneous‖ can readily fit different places in the other half of the
judicial scale of confidence in (another‘s) fact-finding, between zero and ―I
find, de novo.‖ Justice Scalia‘s contrary view—that the two administrative
review standards are each identical to the jury review standard—ultimately
is grounded in a 1939 opinion of the Supreme Court33 enunciating the
review standard that the Court later found the APA to have rejected, in what
had been its most cited administrative law opinion before Chevron,
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.34
In Universal Camera, the Court had found in the APA‘s adoption of the
―substantial evidence‖ test the expression of a congressional ―mood‖
requiring closer review of agency fact-finding in cases to which the test
applied.35 Judge Scalia‘s court, as others, had found that same ―mood‖ in
congressional statutes that required ―substantial evidence‖ review of a
particular agency‘s rulemaking, albeit those rules were adopted under
procedures that normally would invoke ―arbitrary or capricious‖ review.36
In 1999, the ―substantial evidence‖ test would be associated with the more
demanding ―clearly erroneous‖ standard reviewing bench trial findings of
fact in Dickinson v. Zurko.37
Universal Camera again received the back of Justice Scalia‘s hand in
1998, when he authored the Court‘s surprising38 opinion—again involving
factual review—in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB.39

touch review of informal adjudication), with Am. Horse Protection Ass‘n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ordinarily highly permissive review of refusal to accept rulemaking
petition).
33. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
34. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
35. Id. at 487.
36. See generally Indus. Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); AFL v. OSHA, 965
F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
37. 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (―The court/agency standard . . . is somewhat less strict
than the court/court standard. But the difference is . . . so fine that . . . we have failed to
uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of one standard
rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.‖).
38. See, e.g., 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 775
(4th ed. 2002) (―The majority opinion is extraordinary in terms of its degree of departure
from the Court‘s traditional approach to the substantial evidence test.‖); M. Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1429 n.152 (2004) (―Some
scholars point to the recent case of [Allentown Mack] as illustrative of a new era of intense
examination of agency factfinding.‖ (citation omitted)); Note, Judicial Review Gone Awry:
The Supreme Court Rewrites the NLRB’s Unitary Standard in Allentown Mack Sales &
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1925 (1999).
39. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
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CITY OF ARLINGTON
In City of Arlington v. FCC the underlying question was whether the
FCC had the authority under its statute to define what would presumptively
be ―a reasonable period of time‖ for state or local governments to act on
applications for the siting of wireless facilities.40 The Court framed the
issue for its decision as being whether the Chevron framework applied to its
review of this question.41 With Chief Justice Roberts in dissent, assignment
of the majority opinion fell to the senior sitting Justice—Justice Scalia—
and, given this opportunity, he assigned the opinion to himself. By sleight
of hand, perhaps, he appears to have accomplished in City of Arlington the
proposition for which he alone argued in Mead. In majority and dissent, for
eight, deference means only one thing, Chevron. Skidmore and its many
predecessors have disappeared.
That the Chevron framework would apply was to some extent a forgone
conclusion—the FCC was acting formally, with evident juris-generative
intent. The real question would be how the decision framing the FCC‘s
authority was allocated between agency and court—to what extent the
Court would decide issues for itself (as in Hearst it had concluded that
neither state law not a general federal meaning of ―employee‖ controlled,
but rather a definition responsive to national labor policy, the assigned
bailiwick of the NLRB), and to what extent it would simply review for
―reasonableness‖ the exercise of an authority it had found to be assigned to
another. Justice Scalia, for five, treated the first of these questions (what
were the outer limits of agency authority) as if it were simply a matter of
textual analysis: ―Statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds
of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering
agency.‖42 Implicit here is that ―the bounds of reasonable interpretation‖
are for judicial and not agency determination. And later, to the same effect:
―The question in every case is, simply, whether the statutory text forecloses
the agency‘s assertion of authority.‖43 And, finally: ―Where Congress has
established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the
ambiguity will fairly allow,‖ a matter to be determined ―rigorously.‖44
These are the questions of Chevron‘s first step, and thus these questions
are for the court, not the agency. They are, moreover, questions for a court
applying ―traditional tools of statutory interpretation‖—tools which, until
this day, would have included appropriate (that is to say, Skidmore)
deference to agency views. Wholly missing from Justice Scalia‘s opinion,
however, was any suggestion that agency views would influence the
decision how far ambiguity would fairly allow, what the statutory text
forecloses, or what are the bounds of reasonable interpretation. Instead he
takes the question to be whether agency views respecting its ―jurisdiction‖
under an ambiguous statute are in any respect different from its other
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866–68 (2013).
See id.
Id. at 1868.
Id. at 1871.
Id. at 1874.
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conclusions how to act within the space its statute affords it, and concludes
at length that they are not. Any views within ―the bounds of reasonable
interpretation‖ are voiced at Chevron‘s second step and so are entitled to
Chevron deference. How those bounds are to be set—in effect, how the
questions of ―authority‖ that remain for judicial determination differ from
the questions of ―jurisdiction‖ on which agency views are entitled to
Chevron deference—is simply not addressed. The 184 years of precedent
captured in Skidmore have disappeared.
The Chief Justice‘s dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito,
underscores Justice Scalia‘s coup in removing Skidmore and its many
predecessors from view. He expresses concern that the majority, by
extending the Chevron framework to issues of ―jurisdiction,‖ has
compromised the constitutionally necessary authority of the courts to have
the final, independent say what the law is. ―An agency cannot exercise
interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys
that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the
agency. . . . [A] court should not defer to an agency on whether Congress
has granted the agency interpretive authority over the statutory ambiguity at
issue.‖45 But in American Trucking, as we have seen, the Court had readily
reconciled what we have until now known as Skidmore deference with the
necessary authority of courts finally to say what the law is.46 Its reasoning
soon became Skidmore, not Chevron. One can readily agree with the
dissent‘s proposition that ―[w]hether Congress has conferred such power is
the ‗relevant question[] of law‘ that must be answered before affording
Chevron deference,‖47 without at all having to agree that ―the question
whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without
deference to the agency.‖48 Without Chevron deference, yes; without
Skidmore deference, no.
If one puts aside the verbal tussling over ―jurisdiction,‖ much if not all of
the disagreement disappears. What are the boundaries of the agency‘s
authority, conferred by Congress, remains a judicial question, as it must be.
Could recognizing the bearing of agency views at the initial stage of the
Chevron inquiry ever make a difference? Justice Scalia calls up FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.49 and MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.50 (among many other cases) as
two cases in which Chevron had been applied (as indeed it was) ―to
agencies‘ construction of the scope of their own jurisdiction,‖ and in each
of these cases to an ―expansive construction of the extent of its own power
[that] would have wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory
scheme.‖51 But these were also cases in which the agency interpretations
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1877, 1879–80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1880 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
512 U.S. 218 (1994).
Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1872 (majority opinion).
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were ―permissible‖ as a textual matter, as heated dissents amply
demonstrated.52 Why did that not suffice? Agencies operating within their
judicially determined Chevron space may change their views from time to
time; their decisions do not fix statutory meaning in the ways that court
decisions do, and they are expected to vary in their views as changing
circumstances warrant. And the agencies involved in these cases had ample
reason to change their view of their governing texts. In the one case,
evidence had emerged of cigarette companies covertly manipulating the
nicotine content of their products to induce addiction; in the other case, the
supplanting of land lines by microwave transmission had undercut the
natural monopolies telephone companies had to that point enjoyed, and thus
undercut as well the need for rate regulation.
The centuries-old judicial tradition of giving weight to agency views was
premised on stability, participation in the legislative process, and superior
knowledge of congressional purpose; changing views of statutory meaning
would undercut it. If ordinarily agency views respecting their authority
would be entitled to weight, in each of these cases the agency‘s departure
from its own long-established understandings of its powers signaled danger,
not simply an expectable revision of policy to keep pace with changing
times and social circumstances. While not mentioning Skidmore by name,
the majority in these cases was able to stop its inquiry at the first step, on
finding an impermissible meaning given earlier, stable agency views that
commanded respect.
Justice Scalia was the author of MCI and joined Brown & Williamson.
So he agrees that the boundaries of agency authority are not movable over
time, that the space, the authority, an agency has, remains a matter for
judicial determination and for determination not simply as a matter of
―permissible‖ textual meaning. That determination, as Justice Stevens
wrote in Chevron, is to be made employing the ―traditional tools of
statutory interpretation.‖53 And few of those tools are more traditional than
the one that was first voiced by the Court in 1827, repeatedly invoked over
the ensuing years, and captured by Justice Jackson‘s formulation in
Skidmore.
52. At issue in MCI was the FCC‘s statutory authority to ―modify‖ its rate regulation.
512 U.S. at 220. As a dissent made clear, ―modify‖ would bear the FCC‘s meaning. Id. at
239–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the majority, however, considering the state of
telecommunications technology in the 1930s, when the statute was enacted, the meaning the
FCC now wished to give it was unsustainable—it was for Congress, not the Commission, to
effect such a change in FCC rate regulation, however understandable the change might be in
light of technological changes and the current fashionability of deregulation. See id. at 231
(majority opinion). In FDA v. Brown & Willamson, the FDA had adopted new regulatory
measures in relation to tobacco products, relying on both increased evidence of the risks to
human health created by their use and commercial behavior by manufacturers manipulating
and concealing the addictive qualities of nicotine, whose pleasurable effects give humans the
reason to use it. See generally 529 U.S. 120 (2000). Statutory definitions of ―drug‖ readily
reached nicotine and of ―device,‖ cigarettes. But the agency‘s long-held view that it had no
regulatory authority over tobacco products unless benefits to health were claimed, repeatedly
expressed to Congress, were an essential element of the Court‘s conclusion that the FDA had
acted outside its statutory authority. See id. at 161.
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
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The ostensible renunciation of long-established precedent is not the only
mischief to be found in Justice Scalia‘s opinion. In emphasizing that the
Chevron Step Two question is whether an agency interpretation is
―permissible‖—that is, it would seem, simply within the textual bounds of
the authority the Court finds Congress to have given it—his opinion diverts
attention from, if it does not entirely repudiate, the judiciary‘s statutory
responsibilities under the APA. Just as choosing to emphasize Chevron‘s
somewhat misleading diction about ―precise meaning‖ has concealed from
some judges using it the judiciary‘s responsibility to establish the
boundaries of the ambiguity within which agencies may act, quoting
Chevron‘s use of ―permissible‖ without considering the opinion‘s
considerable attention to the reasonableness of the Environmental
Protection Agency‘s choice at issue in that case obscures the APA‘s
command to judicial oversight of agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
requires courts in every review of agency action controlled by the APA to
determine whether it is ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law‖—that is to say, reasonable.
Cherry-picking language from earlier opinions without attention to the
context in which it was used is a familiar enough judicial failing.54
Language in Justice Steven‘s opinion in Chevron does tend to elide the
possible difference between those interpretations that are merely
―permissible‖ and those that are also ―reasonable‖—not just possible, but
also well explained, well related to the materials known to the agency,
based on appropriate factors and not based upon inappropriate ones. Yet
the detail and care of the Chevron opinion makes clear that this prescription
had been followed, notwithstanding the opinion‘s occasional misleading
diction. Justice Souter‘s opinion in Mead, describing Chevron, twice
equates its second step with Section 706(2)(A) review—as indeed one
would think it must. A court could hardly ignore that statutory command
and conclude that mere permissibility, without regard to reasonableness,
suffices. But ―permissible‖ appears again and again in Justice Scalia‘s
discussions of Chevron, and ―reasonable‖ does not. Quoting only that
diction, his opinion concludes: ―If . . . the agency‘s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute,‖ that is the end of the matter.55 For
all that appears, and despite Section 706(2)(A), the reasonableness of its
judgment is of no concern.

54. Cf. Adam Liptak, Steady Move to the Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2013, at A1
(―Chief Justice Roberts has proved adept at persuading the court‘s more liberal justices to
join compromise opinions, allowing him to cite their concessions years later as the basis for
closely divided and deeply polarizing conservative victories.‖).
55. Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.

